Bush Lied, Soldiers and Iraqis Died

And who knows how many in our country because of his policies.

Now we have reached the sad milestone of over 1600 dead Americans, we stand at 1601 dead American Soldiers, and who knows how many dead Iraquis. The Lancet estimates possibly as many as 100,000 and that's a conservative number, most of them women and children.

Bush lied to us about Iraq. And now there's proof. Many of us knew this. On Sunday, May 01, 2005, the Blair government revealed that in July of 2003, 9 months before we invaded Iraq, and 3 months before the Senate approved the Iraq war resolution, that advisors with the Bush administration had consulted with the Blair administration and decided to go to war. The London Sunday Times revealed a memo that was leaked to them from someone in the Blair administration on Sunday May 01, 2005, that this meeting had occurred.

Though Knight Ridder papers have picked up the story, I have found NO reference to the memo in any papers that carry AP and Reuters stories. This is irresponsible.

The memos were extremely alarming, because the second memo from the London Sunday Times revealed that Bush and Blair decided to "Fix the facts to fit the policy" on the Iraq war, at a meeting,three months before Congress approved going to war and while the Bush Administration was saying publically there had no plans to invade Iraq. While many of us have believed that the evidence was false, this memo is proof they created false evidence. And the Blair administration is not denying the memo was real. "Fixing the facts to fit the policy" essentially means that they created false evidence to justify going to war. It means that our actions in Iraq constitute a "war of aggression", which is an international war crime. We attacked an unarmed nation for NO reason, except to make war profiteering profitable for the likes of Haliburton. Both Bush and Blair and their respective administrations participated in this. To quote the memo:

"There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and [weapons of mass destruction]. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. ... There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action."

This must be revealed to the American public - the Europeans know this already, this is the main reason Blair won by such a small margin. To not cover this story is surpressing the news, and the press is not fulfilling its duty as a participant in the 4th estate, as a check and balance in our democracy.


Rep. John Conyers has sent a letter to the President and to his colleagues that discusses a leak to London Times. He posted to the Daily Kos at this diaryand it has all the links to both the leak, and the story about the leak. There is an update to this inquiry.

This is a critically important story and reveals plans by Bush and Blair to create justifications for going to war with Iraq....ie, contrive it.

 

Talking Points

London Times reports that the British government and the United States government had secretly agreed to attack Iraq in 2002, before authorization was sought for such an attack in Congress, and had discussed creating pretextual justifications for doing so.

The Times reports, based on a newly discovered document, that in 2002 British Prime Minister Tony Blair chaired a meeting in which he expressed his support for "regime change" through the use of force in Iraq and was warned by the nation's top lawyer that such an action would be illegal. Blair also discussed the need for America to "create" conditions to justify the war.

From Conyers Diary on Kos The document itself is revealing as it indicates that "Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy." This is the British government proclaiming foreknowledge of the manipulation of intelligence many of us have alleged for some time.

It also quotes the British Foreign Secretary as stating about the case for war: "the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force."

Prime Minister Tony Blair chaired a July 2002 meeting, at which he discussed military options, having already committed himself to supporting President Bush's plans for invading Iraq.

British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw acknowledged that the case for war was "thin" as "Saddam was not threatening his neighbours and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea, or Iran."

A separate secret briefing for the meeting said that Britain and America had to "create" conditions to justify a war.

It is journalists' responsibility to tell the truth and to investigate to be a balance against abuses of power, ie, the 4th branch....

This must be investigated. The American and British people were lied to, and this could very well be treasonous. It was definitely an international war crime. Too many people have died because of this war.

All Saddam was doing was building castles and writing a romance novel. Yes, he was an insane and evil man, but, he wasn't going to do ANYTHING to us. There was no WMD and Bush and Blair knew that and then lied to the US, the UN and the British people. The Iraqis knew this. This is why "insurgents" (really citizens of that country) are blowing up bombs and killing our soldiers.

Don't confuse this with the memo the Blair administration leaked the week before.

The Memo

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY

DAVID MANNING

From: Matthew Rycroft

Date: 23 July 2002

S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option.
Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)

MATTHEW RYCROFT

(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign
policy aide)

Who's covered this:
Guerilla News
Please add as you find them!

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